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Preface

Although there have been many splendid books on early American naval history, there is a need for a new survey of the subject, particularly one with a broad perspective. This book tries
to meet that need. It begins before 1775 because at least until the time of the Civil War American naval history was inﬂuenced greatly by attitudes, practices, and conditions dating
from American colonial history. It pays attention to other navies, particularly those of Britain and France, because American naval history is closely connected with British and French
naval history. Although it can stand alone, it is intended as a
companion volume to my book The Age of the Ship of the Line:
The British and French Navies, 1650–1865 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009). Both books are concerned with
the ways navies reﬂect diplomatic, political, economic, and
social developments.
Looking at American naval history from a wide perspective helps us to avoid reading the United States Navy’s twentieth-century triumphs back into previous centuries. Until the
Civil War, America was a minor naval power. During its ﬁrst
two major wars, the War of American Independence and the
vii
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War of 1812, the American navy was virtually annihilated. It
is true that the navy fought a number of successful combats
against individual enemy ships and even won battles on Lake
Erie and Lake Champlain during the War of 1812. On balance,
however, the record of the American navy during the age of
sail was not very impressive, particularly in comparison with
the British navy, which twice virtually swept it from the sea.
Given America’s enormous resources and growing population, its navy generally was undersized and poorly funded. Its
participation in the Civil War of 1861–65 was very different.
The navy suddenly expanded hugely and performed wonders
against an extremely dangerous enemy. Although the navy
then languished for a couple of decades, the foundations of
American naval power had been established. Once America
decided it wanted a modern navy, it was able to build one in
fairly short order. In the twentieth century it became ﬁrst a
major naval power and then the world’s dominant naval power.
Why did it take almost a century for the United States to
build its ﬁrst large navy? As I will argue, it was largely due to
the continuation of traditions established in America’s colonial
past, such as localism and sectionalism, an obsession with the
frontier and territorial expansion, and an aversion to strong
central government and taxation. By weakening the power of
the states, expanding American industry, and strengthening
the federal government, the Lincoln administration ﬁnally
made possible America’s rise as a naval power.
In writing this book I have beneﬁted from the work of numerous ﬁne historians, including my friends John Hattendorf, Bill Fowler, Thomas Schaeper, Denver Brunsman, and
Jim Bradford; its mistakes are my own. I also wish all too belatedly to acknowledge the encouragement given to me by a
viii
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model naval ofﬁcer, Lieutenant Commander Jay Arnold, executive ofﬁcer of the uss Duncan (ddr 874), aboard which I
served in 1964–66. As with previous books I wish to thank
my wonderful family, particularly my wife, Susan Kruger, and
children, Veronica Lamka, Robert Dull, Max Kruger-Dull, and
Anna Kruger-Dull. I dedicate this book to two history buffs,
my nephews Peter and John Hamburger.
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one
The American Colonies and the
British Navy, 1607–1775

i
The naval great powers during the age of sailing ship warfare
that ended in the middle of the nineteenth century were, with
the exception of Great Britain, not those of the great age of
battleship and aircraft carrier warfare during the ﬁrst half of
the twentieth century. The other great sailing navies, those of
France, Spain, and the Netherlands, played a relatively minor
role during the twentieth century. Instead the British navy was
joined by three newly arrived naval great powers: Japan, Germany, and the United States. All three launched major building programs during the ﬁnal decades of the nineteenth century and quickly became prominent once the United States
defeated Spain in 1898 and Japan defeated Russia in 1904–
1905. The groundwork for this ascendancy was laid earlier,
however. In the middle of the nineteenth century the governments of Germany, Japan, and the United States greatly increased their power. Henceforth they were able to use their
economic growth to become naval great powers. The equivalent of the German uniﬁcation of 1871 and Japan’s Meiji Restoration of 1867–68 was the American Civil War.
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Although the two decades after the end of the Civil War
were a period of naval retrenchment, the Civil War had laid
the foundation for the United States to overcome the attitudes,
practices, and conditions that had hindered the growth of its
navy. These hindrances were part of the legacy of America’s
colonial past.
Between the founding of Jamestown in 1607 and the beginning of the American Revolution in 1775, Britain’s American colonies developed important shipping and ﬁshing industries but undertook little independent naval activity. This
period of subservience to the mother country and to the needs
of the British navy was very inﬂuential, however, in the subsequent development of the American navy. The Revolution
did not eliminate America’s colonial legacy. For the United
States to become a naval power, it had to overcome a number
of the things it inherited from its colonial past: a weak industrial base compared with naval great powers like Britain and
France, a distrust of government and hence a reliance on private enterprise, sectionalism and a preference for state government rather than national government, an inability or reluctance to raise by taxation the money necessary for military
and naval activity, and an obsession with internal expansion
that necessitated a substantial investment on the frontier rather than on the sea. All of these obstacles were present almost
from the beginning of English settlement in North America.
ii
The English colonization of North America began in 1607
(after earlier failures); the ﬁrst permanent French colony was
established a year later. Both Virginia and New France began
as private business investments approved by the respective
2
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crowns. This was a change from the sixteenth-century Spanish model in which the rulers of Castile and Aragon played (at
least in theory) a direct role in exploration and colonization.
Soon, however, the French colony was taken over by the royal
government and administered from Europe. In contrast the
more than a dozen English colonies established between 1607
and 1732 differed not only from the colonies of other nations
but even from one another.1 Some colonies like Connecticut
had their own charters and administered their own affairs under very loose government supervision. Others like Pennsylvania were run by proprietors, who had veto power over the decisions reached by their colonial assemblies. Still others like
Virginia became royal colonies with a governor appointed by
the crown. Even royal governors, however, had to share power with their locally elected assemblies, which, like the English House of Commons (or, after the 1707 union with Scotland, the British House of Commons), used their control over
the budget to gain a share of political power.2
Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the struggle for power between assemblies and their
governors or proprietors left many Americans distrustful of
executive authority; even the inhabitants of Connecticut and
Rhode Island, where governors were popularly elected, distrusted the kings of England, who might take their charters
from them. Moreover, the British government exercised its
own veto power over most colonial legislation, using it, for
example, to control the issuing of currency by individual colonies. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, however,
British control over the North American colonies was administered loosely, largely because Britain was preoccupied with
European affairs.3 These colonies also were considered less
3
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important than the rich sugar-producing colonies of the Caribbean, such as Jamaica. Thus most American politics was
local, and American political life, like American society, was
dominated by wealthy local elites who resented interference
from England.
The North American colonies were diverse not only politically but also socially, economically, culturally, and religiously,
although over the course of the eighteenth century these differences became less marked.4 A planter in the South using
slaves to raise tobacco or rice for European markets had, for
example, different views on politics and economics than did
a small farmer in New England producing for a local market.
The colonies did trade among themselves (usually by sea because long distances and primitive roads made it difﬁcult and
expensive to move products by land), but generally Great Britain and the Caribbean were their most important markets and
the chief sources of their imports. Moreover, except for a relatively efﬁcient intercolonial postal system, the American colonies lacked common institutions. What they did share was a
desire for expansion into new lands. All too often this led to
competition rather than cooperation, such as the attempted
intrusions by Virginia and Connecticut into parts of Pennsylvania. Even in military matters, cooperation between colonies
often was halfhearted or ineffectual.
War was a recurrent part of life in British North America.
Most wars were fought against the Native American nations
whose hunting grounds or agricultural settlements were coveted by British Americans. In the early days of settlement, the
colonies were not self-supporting and depended on supplies sent
from England by sea. Soon, however, they achieved a measure
of self-sufﬁciency. They were able to ﬁght Indian wars using
4
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troops they raised themselves. Fortunately for them, Indian
opposition in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries
was uncoordinated. Unlike the powerful sixteenth-century
Aztec Empire of Mexico or the Inca Empire of Peru, the Indians encountered by the British were divided into many small
tribes or confederations of tribes. By the late seventeenth century few contained more than 10,000 people. The colonists
were able to exploit rivalries between the various Indian nations as well to make use of their own greater population and
advanced weaponry.
More challenging, however, were wars conducted against
neighboring Dutch, Spanish, and French colonies. These sometimes involved the use of ships. Seldom were enemy warships
encountered, but for logistical reasons colonial wars often involved moving troops by sea, usually on transports provided by colonies like Massachusetts. Until the so-called French
and Indian War of 1754–60, most soldiers in British America served in either the militia or colonial regiments. Their frequent target was the French colony of Acadia, located across
the Bay of Fundy from Massachusetts. It was captured on several occasions by New England raiders, but until the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht it was returned to France each time that hostilities ended.
The French colonies initially were less of an obstacle to the
English colonies than was the Dutch colony of New Netherland
along the Hudson River, which separated the New England
colonies from English colonies to the south. In 1664, during
the second of three wars fought between the Netherlands and
Britain in the mid-seventeenth century, a small English squadron captured the city of New Amsterdam and renamed it New
York. During the next war a Dutch squadron recaptured the
5
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city and colony.5 Fortunately for the English, the colony was
returned to England when the war ended in 1674.
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 made William of Orange,
ruler of the Netherlands, and his wife, Mary, daughter of the
deposed James II, joint rulers of England. William’s archenemy, Louis XIV of France, immediately became the enemy of
England and soon went to war on behalf of the exiled James.
The Nine Years’ War (1689–97) was fought chieﬂy in Europe,
but the New England colonies also participated. In 1690 they
even mounted an attack against Quebec, the capital of New
France, but the attack failed.6
The War of the Spanish Succession began in 1702. Another
attack on Quebec was made in 1711, but most of the troops and
the supporting warships were sent from England. Because of
the ineptitude of the British commander, several transports
were wrecked while ascending the St. Lawrence, and the attack was abandoned. An attack on Port Royal, the capital of
Acadia, was successful, however. At the end of the war, Acadia
was retained by Britain, although its borders were not deﬁned
in the 1713 peace treaty.7 This treaty also conﬁrmed both the
accession of Louis’s grandson to the Spanish throne and the
retention of Florida by Spain. (During the war, troops from
South Carolina had made an unsuccessful attack on the Spanish fort at St. Augustine while their Indian allies attacked the
Spanish fort at Pensacola.)8
Soon after the war ended, France and Britain became allies. Tension in North America did not disappear, although it
was moderated by the powerful Iroquois confederation, which
acted as a buffer between the British and French colonies.9
The French, meanwhile, built the large fortiﬁed city of Louisbourg on Isle Royale (now Cape Breton Island) as a shelter
6
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and support for their ﬁshing ﬂeet used in the Newfoundland
and St. Lawrence ﬁsheries.10
Thus far the North American colonies had played only a
minor role in the great wars of Europe. Except for the abortive 1711 attack on Quebec, no large ﬂeets had come to North
American waters. Nonetheless, Britain’s North American colonies did make signiﬁcant, although mostly indirect, contributions to British naval strength. The ways in which the colonies did and did not participate in naval warfare affected the
American navy once the colonies asserted their independence.
iii
Most contemporaries saw trade between the British colonies
and Britain itself as the major colonial contribution to British
naval strength. The mother country’s Navigation Acts channeled much of the colonies’ overseas trade to the British West
Indies or to Great Britain, as well as restricting that trade to
ships built and manned in Britain or its colonies. The purpose of the Navigation Acts was threefold. They enriched the
British treasury, fostered the development of the British economy, and provided for the training of British sailors. (It was
too expensive for Britain’s navy to maintain a large peacetime ﬂeet for training purposes, so most sailors in the navy
received their training aboard merchant ships or ﬁshing vessels; the same, of course, was true for the French and Spanish navies.) By 1775, perhaps a quarter of British shipping tonnage was devoted to trade with British North America and the
British West Indies; moreover, nearly a third of British merchant ships had been built in America, where shipbuilding
costs were less than in Britain.11
The American colonies made other important contributions
7
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to the mother country. They supplied raw materials, such as
indigo for dying fabric, and were an increasingly important
market for British manufactures and services such as banking. American grain, meat, and ﬁsh were vital to feeding the
British West Indies, which devoted almost all their acreage to
crops for export such as sugar. Masts from New England and
naval stores such as pitch, tar, and turpentine from the southern colonies were used by the British navy.12 Colonial troops
not only conducted military operations in North America but
also assisted British troops in the Caribbean.
Although the British colonies in North America were important to the British economy in general and the navy in particular, there were certain areas in which they were not given
the chance to contribute, were not capable of contributing, or
did not choose to contribute. This would hinder naval development once America became independent.
First, the American colonies were given few opportunities
to build warships for the British navy because their ships had
a poor reputation for durability; the colonies, however, were
allowed to repair British warships and to convert merchant
ships into warships. Although the British navy contracted to
build many warships in private dockyards in Great Britain, it
purchased only a few frigates (medium-sized warships of 22
to 44 guns) from American shipyards and none of the larger
ships of the line that were the chief component of naval power.13 The French built a couple of 60-gun ships of the line at
Quebec, as well as some smaller ships, but these were poorly constructed. The only shipbuilding facility in the Western
Hemisphere comparable to the great dockyards of Europe was
at Havana, where the Spaniards, with access to tropical hardwoods, built some of the ﬁnest warships in the world.14 The
8
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specialty of the British colonies was the privateer, a privately
built, owned, and manned but government-sanctioned armed
vessel used chieﬂy to capture enemy merchant ships. These
were built for speed rather than endurance, and served only
during wartime. Hundreds of American privateers were used
during the wars of 1739–48 and 1756–63 against France and
Spain. Although privateers also were used during the American Revolution, American shipyards then also had to build
sturdy, heavily armed warships to match those of the British.15
Second, the economy of the British colonies was underdeveloped by Western European standards, partly because the
British preferred to see them as providers of raw material and
customers for British products rather than as rivals. Thus in
1775 there were only three iron foundries in New England capable of casting cannon for warships.16 Americans also were
short of gunpowder, cannon balls, and other necessities of
naval warfare. The colonies’ greatest shortage, however, was
specie, the gold or silver necessary to provide ﬁnancial backing for currency. When the colonies revolted against Britain,
their ﬁrst response was simply to print money without backing, the same response the Confederacy would adopt in 1861.
In both cases the result was inﬂation and the eventual destruction of the currency’s purchasing power. The American Revolution was saved from disaster by ﬁnancial aid from abroad,
but the American revolutionary navy, virtually unable to pay
its sailors or replace its ship losses, faded into insigniﬁcance.
Third, although many Americas served aboard merchant
ships or ﬁshing boats, few had served as sailors in the British
navy, and almost none had served as ofﬁcers or naval administrators; only three of the American navy’s original twentysix captains had any prior experience in the British navy.17 The
9
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British navy periodically attempted to force American merchant sailors to serve (an imposition called impressment), but
the Americans, claiming to be exempt from such service, refused. They received support from public ofﬁcials and from
crowds that often resorted to intimidation or even violence.
Usually the British gave up the effort.18 Merchant sailors could
learn fairly quickly how to adjust to life aboard privateers or
warships, so this was not a long-term obstacle to the development of an American navy. It was far more difﬁcult, however, to turn merchant ship or privateer ofﬁcers into naval ofﬁcers. This problem would also face the French navy during
the French Revolution, but it at least had a few veteran captains and other ofﬁcers who were willing to serve. The ﬁrst
American navy had no one who had commanded a squadron
of ships, let alone a ﬂeet.19 George Washington had the help
of former British army ofﬁcers like Charles Lee and Horatio Gates and foreign volunteers like “Baron” von Steuben
and the marquis de Lafayette; the navy had only Pierre Landais, an emotionally unstable former French junior ofﬁcer.
It would take considerable time to develop ofﬁcers capable of
commanding a group of ships in combat.
iv
Except for brief hostilities against Spain (and against pirates)
in the 1720s, Britain was at peace from 1713 until 1739. North
America was a backwater for the British navy, which did little more than assign station ships, none larger than a frigate,
to Boston, New York, Charleston, Virginia, and eventually
Savannah.20 The colonies did not have permanent armies or
navies, and there was not even a maritime equivalent to the
rudimentary military training provided by colonial militias.
10
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This period of peace ended when Britain declared war against
Spain in 1739. The colonies participated enthusiastically, but
the initial results were disastrous. Thousands of American provincial troops joined British troops in an attack on the fortiﬁed
seaport of Cartagena de Indias on the northern coast of South
America. The attack, supported by a very large British ﬂeet,
failed, and many of the Americans died of disease. Provincial
troops from Georgia and South Carolina supported by British
frigates also were unsuccessful in an attack on St. Augustine.21
The Spaniards attempted to retaliate with an attack on Georgia
in preparation for an attack on South Carolina, but the other
British colonies were not threatened except by Spanish privateers. When France entered the war in 1744, New York and the
New England colonies were menaced by attack from the Indian allies of New France. Massachusetts governor William Shirley organized an army of New England provincial troops to attack the great fortress of Louisbourg. Although he was able to
assemble a troop convoy and arrange an escort of Massachusetts navy vessels, he needed the assistance of the British navy.
He appealed for help to Commodore Peter Warren, who commanded a small squadron at Antigua in the British West Indies. Warren had spent many years in America, had an American wife, and had participated in the St. Augustine attack. He
brought two small ships of the line and two frigates to Nova
Scotia, where he rendezvoused with the New Englanders. The
attack on Louisbourg caught the French by surprise, and the
city was captured after a seven-week siege. British Americans
had won their ﬁrst great battle, albeit with the help of the British navy. To their disappointment Louisbourg was returned to
France when peace was concluded in 1748, but the border between the British and French colonies remained tense.22
11
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Neither the British nor the French government wished for
another war, but the situation in North America was volatile.
As in 1713, the peace negotiations had failed to deﬁne the limits of Acadia and had left the task of delineating the border
between New France (including Canada and Acadia) and the
British colonies to a bilateral border commission. The British
and French governments failed to come to a general agreement on the issues between them, and the commission’s discussions proved more divisive than helpful. 23 The recent war
had disrupted French trade with Indian nations south of the
Great Lakes. British American traders and land companies
moved to ﬁll the vacuum. A group of Virginia land speculators
sought to open western Pennsylvania to settlement. This led to
armed confrontations between Canadian troops and Virginia
volunteers near what today is Pittsburgh. Subsequent negotiations between the British and French governments failed to
resolve the dispute. In 1755 both governments sent troops to
North America, and open hostilities soon began.24
The British colonies were unprepared for war. As recent
events had demonstrated, they did not even respect one another’s borders. Benjamin Franklin proposed that the colonies establish a joint military command, but his suggestion was rejected by both the British government and colonial assemblies.25
The new war was far wider in scope than previous colonial
wars. The British and French sent regular infantry battalions
and large ﬂeets to North America. Their respective colonists
played a subordinate role in the war, although large numbers
of Canadian and American volunteers and militiamen served
beside the regulars; during the decisive campaign of 1759, for
example, almost 20,000 American troops served with a similar number of British soldiers, while some 10,000 Canadian
12
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militiamen were among the 15,000 troops opposing them.26
Recruitment of American provincial troops was greatly aided by the British government’s willingness to partly subsidize
them, thereby neutralizing American suspicion, disunity, and
reluctance to raise taxes. A major factor in the eventual British triumph was the overwhelming numerical superiority of
the British navy. The colonists did provide troop transports
for an unsuccessful attack on Louisbourg in 1757, but many
transports for the successful campaigns of the following two
years against Louisbourg and Quebec were sent to American
ports from England. Most American sailors worked aboard
merchant ships or privateers.
Other British attacks such as those against Fort Niagara
and Montreal made use of waterways such as Lake Ontario,
Lake George, Lake Champlain, and the St. Lawrence River.27
The ships ranged from small boats to warships carrying as
many as 18 cannon. This was an important precedent; significant naval actions on inland waters would occur during the
wars of 1775–83, 1812–15, and 1861–65.
v
The war ended with the French being driven from the North
American continent. The British victory, however, was even
more destabilizing than had been the indecisive previous war.
It was followed almost immediately by a major Indian war in
1763–64. Worse still, it disrupted relations between the British colonists and the government in Britain. For several decades the government in London had used the colonies as a
source of patronage, while allowing colonial legislatures a considerable degree of autonomy. It had angered American colonists by, among other things, restricting their manufacturing
13
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certain items and restricting their issuing currency. This was
counterbalanced, however, by the protection afforded them by
the British navy, as well as by their pride in being British subjects. They protested when they felt rules were being violated, such as by impressment of sailors in American ports, but
generally their yoke was light enough to be tolerated. Benjamin Franklin, for example, sent to England by the Pennsylvania Assembly to seek redress against Pennsylvania proprietor
Thomas Penn, considered himself simultaneously a Briton,
an American, and a Pennsylvanian. He even lobbied to make
Pennsylvania a royal colony.28
The war, however, altered the relationship between Britain and
its American colonies. With the French threat gone, Americans
no longer needed Britain for protection from European enemies
(and came to see the British army as less a protection from Indians than as a menace to themselves). The war, moreover, had
caused the British to adopt new policies such as sending British
troops to America and had added greatly to the British national debt. The British government now expected the colonies to
help bear the heavy cost of policing the frontier. Furthermore,
British authorities were outraged at the colonists for their massive illegal trade with the French West Indies during the war
against France.29 They now took action to curtail smuggling and
to force compliance with the Navigation Acts, including the deployment of a large number of small warships in American waters.30 Americans attempted to evade British trade restrictions
and even retaliated against British warships, including burning the schooner Gaspee (one of ﬁfteen such ships purchased
in America by the British navy between 1764 and 1775).31 They
began to view Parliament as corrupt, more as a tyrannical European government than as a protector of their interests.
14

Buy the Book

the american colonies and the british navy

The decisive event in the breakdown of relations between
Britain and its colonies was the so-called Boston Tea Party of
December 1773. This destruction of tea sent to America by the
British East India Company prompted Parliament to retaliate
by passing the Coercive Acts, including the closing of Boston
Harbor and numerous other American ports. Americans began preparing for armed resistance, smuggling gunpowder
from Europe and the West Indies, and seizing cannon from
minor British military posts.32 Open hostilities began in April
1775 when a British army detachment from Boston attempted
to seize gunpowder from the neighboring towns of Lexington
and Concord. Americans now faced not only the British army
in Boston but the entire British navy. They would also have to
deal with the legacies of their own past: rivalries among the
different states and regions of the country, distrust of central
government, a preference for printing money rather than paying taxes, a shortage of leaders with experience in Europeanstyle military and naval warfare, a rudimentary bureaucracy,
and an unevenly developed economy.
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